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This paper tests the hypothesis that enterprises may 
forgo formal finance in lieu of informal credit by choice.  
They do so to avoid the additional regulatory scrutiny 
and harassment that engaging with the formal financial 
sector invites. We test this hypothesis using enterprise-
level data on 3,564 enterprises in 29 countries. In this 
sample, enterprises finance approximately 57 percent 
of their working capital requirements with external 
finance. This external finance comes from formal 
sources, such as commercial banks (53 percent) and 
This paper—a product of the Enterprise Analysis Unit in the Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to better understand how the legal and regulatory environment affects financial 
access. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at msafavian@worldbank.org.  
informal sources (42 percent), such as trade creditors, 
or family and friends. In our sample, 14 percent of 
enterprises rely exclusively on informal finance. We find 
that the likelihood of enterprises preferring to only use 
informal finance is inversely related to the quality of the 
regulatory environment, particularly the quality of tax 
administration and overall governance.  For example, we 
find that when an enterprise has been asked for bribes 
by tax inspectors, it is 17 percent more likely to prefer 
informal finance.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Evidence of perceived financing constraints often comes in the form of enterprises’ 
reliance on informal financing sources, rather than formal sources such as commercial 
banks.  Since informal financing is generally considered an imperfect substitute for 
formal finance, the literature assumes that enterprises that heavily rely on informal credit 
do so primarily because they are rationed out of formal credit markets.   
 
The segmentation of credit markets between the formal and informal is largely attributed 
to credit rationing by lenders as a result of information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Bell et. al., 1997).  For example, deficiencies in the legal and institutional 
environment can make it difficult for banks to enforce contracts (La Porta et. al., 1997, 
1998; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Jappelli et. al., 2005; Djankov et. al., 2007).  Poor 
financial information makes it more challenging for formal lenders to sort and monitor 
borrowers (Love and Mylenko, 2003).   In rural areas distance to formal providers is a 
key barrier to lending (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999).   The result is that banks exclude 
some borrowers, and the informal sector serves those borrowers who are excluded by 
banks.   
 
This paper focuses on reasons other than rationing that affect enterprises’ source of 
financing choices.  In particular, we test the hypothesis that enterprises choose informal 
sources of financing over formal ones in order to avoid the additional regulatory scrutiny 
and harassment that engaging with the formal financial sector might invite.   Dealing with 
banks can leave enterprises vulnerable to predatory regulators and onerous regulations.  
We test this hypothesis using enterprise-level data on over 3,500 enterprises spanning 29 
countries. 
 
In overregulated economies, enterprises have incentives to hide assets and to circumvent 
burdensome rules and regulations.  Examples of this behavior can be found by looking at 
the negative correlations between burdensome business registration procedures and 
enterprise registration, or complex tax procedures and the collection of public revenues.      3
When business regulations are too complex, costly, or are linked to rent-seeking activities 
by public officials, enterprises will rationally expend resources or forgo opportunities in 
an effort to avoid them (Djankov et.. al. 2002; Johnson et. al. 2002; Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007).    
 
Overly burdensome regulations can spill into financial markets because the same 
information used to signal repayment capacity to banks can also serve as a signal to 
regulatory authorities and other public officials.  The result of this signaling is that 
enterprises create a greater amount of transparency revolving around their business 
operations, making it easier for them to be targeted by public officials.    
 
A higher tax burden, retroactive penalties, more frequent inspections, increased licensing 
requirements, or a higher demand for bribes can follow.  Enterprises recognize this, and 
may choose to entirely forgo formal finance if the benefits do not outweigh the costs 
(e.g., the cost of regulatory harassment).  We show that this is more likely to be the case 
in countries and regions characterized by an excessive regulatory environment, and/or a 
corrupt bureaucracy.   In particular we find that the odds of an enterprise choosing 
informal finance increase by over 1% for each one unit increase in the variable on time to 
pay taxes (taxtime).  Even more important than regulations per se, however, is the 
honesty of the bureaucracy charged to enforce these regulations.  For example, the 
probability of an enterprise choosing informal finance increases as harassment for bribes 
by tax inspectors increases – and this number goes from 8% to 39% between the bottom  
and the top deciles of the distribution of harassment by tax inspectors.    
 
This paper adds to the sparse literature on the link between corruption, regulation, and 
financial markets.   Other authors have examined the link between corruption and access 
to finance, but from a supply-side perspective.  For example, La Porta et. al. (2003) 
examine the benefits of related lending in Mexico, and find that loans to enterprises 
controlled by the bank’s owners are more likely to end in default, and have lower 
recovery rates.  Banerjee et. al. (2007) find that in Indian public banks, incidences of 
exposed corruption by bank authorities result in reduced lending.  This is because loan   4
officers in government banks cite fear of prosecution for corruption as a reason for their 
rigid lending decisions.   Finally, Beck et. al. (2007) find that a supervisory strategy that 
forces banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the 
degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to enterprises raising external 
finance.   To the best of our knowledge, this study is unique in that it links corruption and 
the quality of the regulatory environment to the demand for financial products by 
enterprises.    
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data sources used to test the 
hypothesis, and analyzes general patterns of enterprise finance across countries and 
regions. Section III presents the estimation and results while Section IV focuses on tests 
of robustness.  Section V  concludes.   
 
II. Data and Main Variables  
 
The hypothesis that a heavy regulatory environment drives enterprises to finance 
informally is tested using enterprise-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
3  
The data used for the analysis cover approximately 3500 enterprises in 29 countries - 27 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Ireland and Spain.  We only include 
enterprises with external sources of credit to finance working capital needs.  Surveys 
were conducted in 2005.    Below we describe the main variables used in this paper.  A 
more detailed description is provided in Table 1.  Table 2 summarizes the main variables 
by country.   
 
Dependent Variable  
  
We test the hypothesis that enterprises may choose to finance their operations exclusively 
through informal creditors in order to avoid regulatory scrutiny.   Informal finance is 
defined as any financial contract or financing arrangement that is provided by lenders that 
are not regulated financial intermediaries.  The survey data captures the percent of 
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working capital financed externally, either from formal sources (primarily banks), or 
from an array of informal sources such as trade creditors, moneylenders, and friends or 
family.  Enterprises, on average, finance more than half of their working capital needs 
(53%) with external finance.  54% of external finance comes from commercial banks, 
while 46% of external finance comes from informal sources (24% from trade creditors, 
17% from friends and family, and 5% from moneylenders).  Figure 1 highlights 
variations in enterprise portfolios depending on their preferred sources of finance. 
 
Informal finance sources are quite heterogeneous.  They vary in terms of the conditions 
offered to clients (expensive in the case of a moneylender and trade creditor) and their 
relationships to the borrower (varies from arms’ length to close friend or family).
4  
However, informal sources have a number of common characteristics.    
 
Informal creditors can screen and monitor borrowers and enforce contracts without 
having to rely on written evidence of cash flow, profitability, business plans, and without 
recourse to the legal system.  This is because they acquire information through personal 
or business relationships with borrowers, through interlinked contractual arrangements, 
and/or can credibly threaten to seize a borrower’s assets without recourse to the formal 
legal system.  Because of this, informal lenders do not rely on the same sort of formal 
signals of creditworthiness as banks and other financial intermediaries.   In this sense, 
enterprises who rely exclusively on informal lenders can avoid producing financial 
statements that could potentially make their operations more transparent to regulatory 
authorities.   
 
To capture enterprise financing choices among external creditors, a binomial dependent 
variable [1,0] is constructed which measures whether enterprises prefer to rely 
exclusively on informal finance [1] or whether they prefer bank finance [0].   The 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, data on interest rates for various credit sources in the data set is unavailable.  However, the 
literature on cost of financing for various forms of informal finance is deep.  It is well known that 
moneylenders and trade creditors charge much higher rates of finance than most intermediaries (See Tirole, 
2004, and Petersen and Rajan, 1999 for detailed term on trade credit, Conning, 2002 for terms on 
moneylenders).     6
variable comes from enterprises reporting of percentage of working capital financed by 
retained earnings, bank credit, and various informal sources.   
 
An enterprise’s financing choice is categorized as ‘1’ if their working capital needs are 
entirely met through informal finance and if they indicated that the reason they do not use 
bank finance is because they do not need or want bank loans (Column 3 Figure 1).  A 
financing choice is categorized as ‘0’ if the enterprise’s working capital needs are met by 
any amount of bank credit (Column 1 Figure 3) or if an enterprise indicates they do not 
have bank credit but would have preferred to use bank credit (Column 2 Figure 3).   
Reasons that an enterprise might prefer bank credit (but not use it) range from having 
applied for a loan and been denied to not applying because collateral requirements were 
too exigent, or because the terms and conditions were unattractive.   Approximately 14% 
of enterprises prefer to use only informal sources, while 86% of enterprises use (72%), or 
would prefer to use (14%), bank credit.    
 
In Table 4  enterprise characteristics are shown across financing preferences.    We 
observe differences across enterprises on the age, size, and asset values.  A significantly 
higher percent of enterprises that prefer bank loans (formal finance) have their financial 
statements audited (approximately 56% versus 44%).  However, enterprise performance, 
measured by either employment growth or labor productivity, does not vary significantly 
across enterprise groupings.    
 
Explanatory Variables  
 
The explanatory variables used to test the hypothesis are various measures of corruption, 
regulation and enterprise transparency, at both the enterprise and country level.   
Specifically, we look at measures of corruption, tax regulations and administration, 
business registration and licensing procedures, labor regulations and land registration.   
 
At the enterprise level, the analysis relies on several measures of enterprises’ perceptions 
of the business environment, including indicators on the transparency of enterprises’   7
operations vis-à-vis the tax authorities, regulatory harassment in the form of bribes or 
inspections, and perceptions of regulatory obstacles.  Reliance on enterprises’ perceptions 
and subjective evaluation of corruption and other regulatory burdens raises concerns 
about the potential endogeneity between explanatory and dependent variables.   To help 
deal with this problem, we use location averages as instruments. Because the enterprise 
level data consists of subjective opinions and recall data, measurement error is likely to 
be of concern, particularly in the bribe and corruption data.  However, using grouped 
averages as instruments can also serve to mitigate the measurement error (Krueger and 
Angrist, 2001).   
 
For robustness purposes, variables from the World Bank indicators on Doing Business 
are used to capture the regulatory burden at the country level.
5  These variables are 
quantitative measures of business regulations and the protection of property rights across 
countries in our data set.   We use measures of the cost of regulation revolving around 
taxation, business registration, employment rigidities, property registration, and licensing.  
Because country fixed effects are used in our model, these country-level variables are 
interacted with enterprise perception variables matching each of the Doing Business 
variables in question.  For example, Doing Business variables on tax administration at the 
country level (e.g. number of tax payments in a given country, or days needed to make 
tax payments) are interacted with enterprise perceptions of tax administration as a 
business constraint.  A similar approach is employed for all country level variables.   
 
We control for enterprise characteristics which may influence an enterprise’s financing 
portfolio;   enterprise size, ownership, and legal status.  The variable on ownership 
(foreign-owned versus domestic) was subsequently dropped, as it was consistently 
insignificant.  Country and industry fixed effects are used throughout the estimation.     
 
Table 1  provides a detailed description of all variables.  Table 2  presents summary 
statistics by country of all the main variables.   One can see from Table 2 that the 
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(2002) and Botero et al. (2004).     8
preference for informal finance varies considerably across countries.  While the mean 
percent of enterprises from the sample which prefer informal finance is 14%, this masks 
considerable differences across countries - from a low of 1% in Croatia, to a maximum of 
33% in Azerbaijan.    
     
Similarly, measures of regulation and corruption also vary significantly across countries.  
The number of tax payments necessary to fulfill tax obligations to the government ranges 
from a low of 8 payments in Ireland and Latvia, to a high of 130 in Uzbekistan.  In 
Ireland, for example, the average degree to which paying bribes is considered common 
and necessary (Br-common, scale of 1-4) is a low of 1.27, while in Kyrgyz Republic the 
mean is a high of 2.91.  We also see a high variation regarding firm financial reporting.  
For example, in Ireland and Estonia, enterprises report over 94% of their sales to tax 
authorities, while in Turkey, Albania, or FYR Macedonia, these same figures are in the 
range of 70%.   
 
Table 3 presents correlations between the main explanatory variables.  Correlations exist 
between almost all measures of corruption identified by enterprises in the sample.  In 
particular, the variable capturing how commonplace bribe payments are considered (Br-
common) is correlated with almost all other dimensions of corruption – including 
perceptions of bribe demands during inspections (Br-taxmtg, Br-safeinsp, Br-fireinsp, Br-
taxinsp), and the two variables measuring bribe levels to secure government contracts 
(Br-govcon and Br-convalue).   The consistency of these correlations is reassuring, given 
that perceptions of corruption can be noisy (Fisman and Svenson, 2007).   
 
It is also worth noting that corruption and bribe variables are highly correlated with 
regulatory procedures, but not with regulatory costs.   In particular, note that the number 
of procedures necessary to register and transfer property (Landreg_proc) and the number 
of payments and procedures necessary to complete the payment of taxes (Taxpay) are 
both consistently correlated with various measures of bribe payments.  Yet, explicit costs 
of these regulations, such as the cost to register property or the tax rate (Landreg_cost, 
Taxrate) are uncorrelated with corruption variables.  This is consistent with the tollbooth   9
theory of regulation, that regulatory procedures are designed to extract bribes by rent-
seeking public officials.   
 
III. Estimation and Results  
 
We argue that enterprises’ preference to use informal finance exclusively depends, in 
part, on the risks and burdens imposed on enterprises by the regulatory environment.  
When the cost of compliance is high – either through the de jure rules of regulation, or 
because predatory regulators seek bribes from enterprises – enterprises may choose to 
stay below the radar screen of regulation.  Since applying for formal sector loans entails 
becoming more financially transparent, enterprises may choose to forgo formal finance.  
This is because the same mechanisms enterprises use to signal creditworthiness to formal 
sector lenders, also make enterprise operations more transparent and easier to monitor for 
regulatory authorities.   We test the hypothesis that enterprises are more likely to opt out 
of the formal financial by choice if they operate in a predatory regulatory environment.   
 
A maximum likelihood estimation technique is used to estimate a binomial logit of 
unordered enterprise sectoral choice.  Y is the dependent variable indicating enterprise 
sectoral choice:  
Y=0 if the ith enterprise has some form of formal finance and  
   =1 if the ith enterprise relies only on informal finance, and is financially unconstrained 
 
The probability of a particular sectoral choice is given by: 
Yij*=f(X1,…XN) +e 
where  
Yij*=probability that some enterprise i will choose outcome j (prefers formal finance), 
Yij=observed dummy that is equal to one when outcome j (prefers exclusive use of 
informal finance) is observed, 
X1=enterprise size, 
X2=legal status, 
X3:XN=measures of corruption and regulation   10
 
 
The choice of explanatory variables X is guided by the analytical arguments discussed 
earlier.  In particular a number of variables capturing corruption and regulatory burden 
are included.  Specifically we look at variables on prevalence of corruption and bribes, 
tax regulation and administration, business registration and licensing, labor rigidities, and 
constraints to acquiring and transferring immovable property.   
 
Since the hypothesis is that enterprises’ preference for informal finance is a spillover 
effect of a burdensome regulatory environment, we expect the signs of most of our 
variables to be positive, indicating a positive association between measures of regulation 
and exclusive use of informal finance.  The exception will be the expected signs on our 
variables which measure transparency (taxreport_sales and taxreport_labor).  Here we 
hypothesize a negative sign, indicating that the closer aligned actual and reported levels 
of income and labor figures are, the more likely enterprises will choose bank credit over 
informal finance.    The rationale is straightforward – the less these enterprises have to 
hide from regulatory authorities, the more likely they are to credibly signal to formal 
financial intermediaries with accurate financial reporting.    
 
We now consider the maximum likelihood estimates of the binomial logit model of 
enterprise sectoral choice.  Tables 5-7 show the cross-sectional results on the factors 
influencing the choice of informal finance, testing the impact of various dimensions of 
the regulatory environment for businesses on enterprises’ financing patterns.        
 
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions using variables measuring corruption and 
paying bribes.  Controls for enterprise size and legal status are included.
6  A number of 
the variables are positive and significant.  In particular, the variables measuring the 
degree to which bribes are solicited during meetings or inspections (Br-taxmtg and Br-
taxinsp), and the cost (in bribes) of securing government contracts (Br-convalue) are 
significant and positive.  Our composite variable for overall bribes (Binary Bribe Index) 
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is also positive and significant. Based on the reported coefficients, we find that when an 
enterprise is solicited for a bribe from any agency covered by the survey (Binary Bribe 
Index), they are 8% more likely to choose informal finance exclusively, and they are 17% 
more likely to choose informal finance exclusively if solicited for a bribe by a tax 
inspector.     
 
In Table 6, the results of measures of tax administration and regulation on enterprise 
financing preferences are shown.  The findings suggest that the administration of taxes is 
an important factor in enterprise financing patterns, while tax rates are not.  In particular, 
the variables approximating the number of tax payments, and the time needed to 
complete the revenue collection system (Taxpay and Taxtime respectively) are positively 
and significantly associated with the preference for informal finance.
7   For every one 
unit increase in the variable Taxtime, the probability of enterprises choosing informal 
finance increases by 1%.  And this number goes from 8% to 39% between the bottom and 
top ends of the distribution of taxtime on this variable.   
 
The findings also suggest that enterprises that obfuscate financial reporting are more 
likely to rely on informal finance.  Tax Report Sales and Tax Report Labor (variables that 
measure truth in reporting to tax authority on sales and employment) have the expected 
sign (both negative), while the latter variable is significant.  Finally, we see that our 
variable on tax rates has no significant impact on enterprise financing preferences.   
 
Variables on other regulatory procedures were also tested.  Table 7 shows the results for 
land regulations, which are consistent with the findings on corruption and tax regulation. 
More burdensome and onerous procedures for registering property are significantly 
associated with informal financing preferences.  However, labor regulations, business 
registration procedures, and licenses costs and procedures were also tested against 
enterprise financing patterns, and were not found to be significant in the overall sample.   
 
                                                 
7 The Taxpay, Taxtime variables are interacted with an enterprise perception variable on tax administration 
as a constraint.  Taxrate is interacted with an enterprise perception variable on tax rate as a constraint.     12
IV  Robustness Checks  
 
As a robustness check, we also test the relationship between financing patterns and 
regulatory burdens on small enterprises exclusively.  Tables 5-7 also show the results of 
regressions for small enterprises only
8.   One concern with the cross-section data is that 
there is endogeneity in enterprise location choices.  Enterprises may choose ex ante not to 
locate in countries or regions with unfavorable regulatory environments, and this could 
bias our results.  We try to check for this by limiting our analysis to small, indigenous 
enterprises.  Presumably these enterprises do not have the same mobility and location-
choice options as large, foreign-owned enterprises.     
 
The results show that the regulatory environment matters for small enterprise financing 
decisions as well.  The results on the corruption regressions (Table 5) show that one 
additional variable becomes significant (Br-common), and that the direction and 
significance for the other corruption variables hold.   The impact of tax regulation and 
administration on small enterprise financing preferences is also similar to the larger 
population of enterprises from our sample (Table 6).  The significance and direction of all 
the tax variables hold.  Additionally, all the significance and direction of the variables on 
land registration costs and regulations for small enterprises are constant (Table 7).   
 
We are also interested in understanding whether or not enterprises’ preferences for 
informal finance under unfavorable regulatory and governance conditions depend on the 
honesty and transparency of the enterprise itself.    In other words, are honest, transparent 
enterprises likely to choose informal finance under adverse regulatory conditions?  Or is 
it the case that this mechanism happens only with enterprises that avoid taxes and 
regulations in general?    Our data allows us to test this, because we have enterprise level 
information on the percent of sales revenue, and the percent of the labor force that is 
reported to tax officials (Tax Report Sales, Tax Report Labor).    We looked at a subset of 
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enterprises in the sample that identify themselves as under-reporting tax earnings and 
labor force by a significant margin – less than 80 percent of sales and labor force
9.   
 
Tables 8-9 show the results for enterprises that are transparent (‘honest’ enterprises), 
versus those enterprises who evade taxes (‘dishonest’ enterprises).  We find that for 
‘dishonest’ enterprises none of our corruption coefficients remain significant.  However, 
the regulatory burdens per se are significant – all of our earlier measures of regulatory 
burden remain significant, while variables approximating business licensing obstacles 
(Busregcost) and employment rigidities (Labregs_firecost) become robust for this set of 
enterprises.  On the other hand, for ‘honest’ enterprises, we find that the significance of 
all of the earlier corruption variables still hold (with the exception of our bribe index 
variable).  For measures of regulatory burden, our earlier results hold for ‘honest’ 
enterprises (with one exception, Taxpay).   
 
We also were interested in understanding the role of enterprise performance in financing 
outcomes.  It could be that enterprise performance is linked to corruption (corrupt 
regulators identify better performing enterprises to extract bribes from), and therefore it is 
actually enterprise performance driving our results.  If this is the case, it would bias our 
estimates in the opposite direction, since better-performing enterprises may be more 
likely to select into formal financial markets.  Still, we checked to see if the results hold 
for better performing enterprises.  We find that top performers are not more affected by 
corruption and other regulatory burdens.




This study is motivated by the limited empirical evidence regarding the validity of the 
credit rationing hypothesis for enterprises.  In view of the fact that approximately 14 % of 
a representative sample of enterprises prefer the exclusive use of informal finance, we 
                                                 
9 For this robustness check, we chose a cutoff at the 75
th percentile of an enterprises’ percent of sales and 
labor reported for tax purposes.  The 75
th percentile corresponds with enterprises reporting more than 80% 
of their sales and labor. 
10 Top performers are defined as those enterprises in the top 25% by measure of sales/employees, 
controlling across industries.   14
investigate if the regulatory environment may be a factor in driving the decision-making 
process.    
 
Focusing on enterprises with short-term loans for working capital, evidence from 
approximately 3,500 enterprises in 29 countries suggests that the regulatory environment 
is a factor in enterprises’ preference for informal creditors.  Enterprises facing higher and 
more frequent demand for bribes, and that deal with onerous regulatory obstacles, are 
more likely to prefer informal finance.   
 
In predatory regulatory environments, enterprises will forgo opportunities in order to 
avoid the burden of regulation.  Enterprises may forgo opportunities to engage in 
borrowing from banks because they do not want to make their operations more 
transparent, want to hide assets in order to minimize tax payments, and do not want to 
make themselves vulnerable to rent-seeking officials.   
   15
References  
 
Banerjee A., S. Cole, and E. Duflo.  2007.  Are Monitors Over-Monitored?  Evidence 
from Corruption and Lending in Indian Banks.  Unpublished manuscript.   
 
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine.  2007.  Bank Supervision and Corruption 
in Lending.  Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.   
 
Bell, C. 1988. Credit Markets and Interlinked Transactions, in H. Chenery and T.N. 
Srinivasa, eds., Handbook of Development Economics. Amersterdam:  North Holland.   
 
Bell, C., T.N.  Srinivasan, and C. Udry.  1997.  Rationing, Spillover and Interlinking in 
Credit Markets:  The Case of Rural Punjab.  Oxford Economic Papers, 49: 557-587. 
 
Binswanger, Hans, and Mark Rosenzweig. 1986.  Credit Markets, Wealth and 
Endowments in Rural South Asia.  World Bank Discussion Paper.   
 
Botero, J.,  S. Djankov, R. de la Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer. 2004.  The 
Regulation of Labor.  Quarterly Journal of Economics:  119, no. 4: 1339-82.  
 
Djankov, S., R. de la Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer. 2002.  The Regulation of 
Entry. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 1: 1-37.  
 
Djankov S. , C. McLeish, A. Shleifer. 2007.  Private Credit in 129 Countries.  Journal of 
Financial Economics, forthcoming.   
 
Fisman, R., and J. Svensson. 2007.  Are corruption and taxation really harmful to 
growth?  Enterprise level evidence.  Journal of Development Economics 83: 63-75.   
 
Hoff, K., and J. Stiglitz. 1993. Immperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets:  
Puzzles and Policy Perspectives.  In K. Hoff, A. Braverman, and J. Stiglitz, eds., The 
Economics of Rural Organization:  Theory, Practice, and Policy, 32-52. New York: 
Oxford University Press for the World Bank. 
 
Jain, A. 1999.  Symbiosis vs. Crowding-Out:  The Interaction of Formal vs. Informal 
Credit Markets in Developing Countries.  Journal of Development Economics, 59: 419-
444.   
 
Jappelli, T., and Marco Pagano. 2002.  Information Sharing, Lending, and Defaults:  
Cross-country evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 26: 2017-2045.   
 
Jappelli, T., M. Pagano, and M. Bianco. 2005. Courts and banks:  Effect of judicial costs 
on credit market performance. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37: 223-244.   
 
Johnson, S., J. McMillan, and C. Woodruff.  2002.  Property Rights and Finance.  
American Economic Review  92, No. 5:1335-56.     16
 
Krueger, A.B., J. Angrist. 2001.  Instrumental variables and the search for identification:  
From supply and demand to natural experiments?  Journal of Economic Perspectives 15: 
69-85.   
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1997. Legal Determinants 
of External Finance.  Journal of Finance 52: 1131-1150.   
 
———. 1998. Law and Finance.   Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113-1115.  
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and G. Zamarrita.  2003.  Related Lending.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 18, No. 1: 231-68.  
 
Love, I., and N. Mylenko.  2003.  Credit reporting and financing constraints.  World 
Bank Policy Research Paper, No. 3142.  
 
McMillan, J., and C. Woodruff.  1999.  Interenterprise relationships and informal credit 
in Vietnam.  Quarterly Journal of Economics; 114, No. 4:1285-1320.   
 
Pal, Sarmistha. 2002.  Household sectoral choice and effective demand for rural credit in 
India. Applied Economics, 14: 1743-1755.   
 
Petersen, M., and R. Rajan. 1997.  Trade credit:  Theories and Evidence.  The Review of 
Financial Studies, 10, no. 3: 661-691.   
 
Stiglitz, Joseph, and A. Weiss.  1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information.  The American Economic Review, 71, no. 3: 393-409.   
 
Tirole, Jean. 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press.   
   17
Table 1:  Variable Description 
Variable   Description  
Inform  Dependent binary variable.  Indicates whether or not a financially unconstrained 
enterprise relies exclusively on informal finance, or uses some formal finance.  
Variable takes on a value of 1 if the former is the case and 0 if the enterprise uses 
formal finance.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).  
Br-common  Subjective categorical variable capturing enterprise perception of whether it is 
common to pay informal payments/gifts to get things done with regard to customs, 
taxes, licenses and regulation.  Scale of variable is 1-4, with 4 being associated with 
strong agreement.  Mean taken at sub-national level.   Higher values indicate more 
corruption.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Br-taxmtg  Mean of a binary variable on whether or not a gift or informal payment was actually 
requested at a meeting with a tax official.  1 indicates ‘Yes’ 0 indicates ‘No’ not true 
2==No.  Variable aggregated at the sub-national level.  Higher values indicate more 
corruption. 
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Br-govcon Subjective  categorical variable capturing enterprise perception on whether its 
common to pay bribes to obtain government contracts.  Scale of variable is 1-6, with 
6 indicating ‘Always necessary.’  Mean taken at sub-national level.  Higher values 
indicate that bribe payments more common.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Br-safeinsp Subjective  categorical variable capturing enterprise perception on whether its 
common to pay bribes occupational health and safety inspections.  Scale of variable 
is 1-6, with 6 indicating ‘Always necessary.’  Mean taken at sub-national level.  
Higher values indicate that bribe payments more common.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Br-fireinsp  Subjective categorical variable capturing enterprise perception on whether its 
common to pay bribes during fire inspections.  Scale of variable is 1-6, with 6 
indicating ‘Always necessary.’  Mean taken at sub-national level.  Higher values 
indicate that bribe payments more common.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Br-taxinsp  Subjective categorical variable capturing enterprise perception on whether its 
common to pay bribes to deal with taxes and tax collection.  Scale of variable is 1-6, 
with 6 indicating ‘Always necessary.’  Mean taken at sub-national level.  Higher 
values indicate that bribe payments more common.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
Br-convalue  Percent of contract value typically paid in additional or informal payments or gifts 
to secure a contract when doing business with the government.   Mean taken at sub-
national level.  Higher values indicate more corruption.   
Taxpay  Taxpay is a country level variable that measures the number of tax payments per 
country, standardized to reflect the total number of taxes paid, the method of 
payment, frequency of payment and no. of agencies involved.  Variable is anchored 
by an enterprise’s perception of tax administration as a constraint (subjective 
categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s assessment of tax administration as a 
constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  
Higher values indicate tax administration is more problematic.   
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Taxtime  This indicator is a country level variable that measures the time to prepare, file and 
pay (or withhold) three major types of taxes:  corporate income tax, value added or 
sales tax and labor taxes, including payroll and social security contributions.   
Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception of tax administration as a 
constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s assessment of   18
tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, with 4 indicating 
a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate tax administration is more problematic.  
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Taxrate  Taxrate is a country level variable that measures the amount of taxes payable by the 
business in the second year of operation, expresses as a share of commercial profits.  
The total amount of taxes is the sum of all different taxes payable after accounting 
for deduction and exemptions.   Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception 
of the tax rate as a constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an 
enterprise’s assessment of tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  
Scale of 1-4, with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate tax 
administration is more problematic.   
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Taxreport_sales
11  Percent of total sales declared by enterprises for tax purposes.   Mean taken at sub-
national level.  Higher values indicate more transparency vis-à-vis the tax 
authorities.  
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).    
Taxreport_labor
12  Percent of labor force declared by enterprises for tax purposes.   Mean taken at sub-
national level.  Higher values indicate more transparency vis-à-vis the tax 
authorities. 
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).    
Landreg_proc  Landreg_proc is a country level variable that measures the full number of 
procedures necessary when a business purchases land and a building to transfer the 
property title from the seller to the buyer so that the buyer can use the property for 
expanding its business, as collateral in taking new loans or to sell to another 
business.    Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception of the land 
regulations as a constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s 
assessment of tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, 
with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate land regulations are 
more problematic.   
 
Landreg_cost  Landreg_cost  is a country level variable that measures cost (as a percent of the 
property value) for completing the full number of procedures necessary when a 
business purchases land and a building to transfer the property title from the seller 
to the buyer so that the buyer can use the property for expanding its business, as 
collateral in taking new loans or to sell to another business.    Variable is anchored 
by an enterprise’s perception of the land regulations as a constraint (subjective 
categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s assessment of tax administration as a 
constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  
Higher values indicate land regulations are more problematic.   
 
Landreg_time   Landreg_time is a country level variable that measures the median duration (in 
days) that property lawyers or registry officials indicate is necessary to complete the 
process of property registration for purchases of land and/or a building to transfer 
the property title from the seller to the buyer so that the buyer can use the property 
for expanding its business, as collateral in taking new loans or to sell to another 
business.    Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception of the land 
regulations as a constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s 
                                                 
11 Taxreport_sales measures the percent of total sales reported for tax purposes by asking a enterprise the following, “Recognizing 
the difficulties that many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total annual sales would 
you estimate the typical enterprise in your area of business reports for tax purposes?” 
12 Taxreport_labor measures the percent of the total labor force reported for tax purposes by asking a enterprise the following, 
“Recognizing the difficulties that many enterprises face in fully complying with labour regulations, what percentage of total workforce 
would you estimate the typical enterprise in your area of business reports for tax purposes?”   19
assessment of tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, 
with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate land regulations are 
more problematic.   
 
Labregs_hire  Labregs_hire is a country level variable that measures the difficulty of hiring 
employees.    Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception of the labor 
regulations as a constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s 
assessment of tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, 
with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate labor regulations are 
more problematic.   
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Labregs_hours  Labregs_hours is a country level variable that measures the rigidity of labor 
regulations governing hours employees can work.    Variable is anchored by an 
enterprise’s perception of the labor regulations as a constraint (subjective 
categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s assessment of tax administration as a 
constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  
Higher values indicate labor regulations are more problematic.   
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Labregs_rigid  Labregs_rigid is a country level variable that measures the rigidity of labor 
regulations.   Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception of the labor 
regulations as a constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s 
assessment of tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, 
with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate labor regulations are 
more problematic.   
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Labregs_fire  Labregs_fire is a country level variable that measures the difficulty of firing an 
employee.   Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception of the labor 
regulations as a constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s 
assessment of tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, 
with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate labor regulations are 
more problematic.   
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Labregs_firecost  Labregs_firecost is a country level variable that measures the costs of firing an 
employee.   Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception of the labor 
regulations as a constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s 
assessment of tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, 
with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate labor regulations are 
more problematic.   
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Labregs_hirecost  Labregs_hirecost is a country level variable that measures the costs associated with 
hiring an employee.   Variable is anchored by an enterprise’s perception of the labor 
regulations as a constraint (subjective categorical variable, capturing an enterprise’s 
assessment of tax administration as a constraint to doing business.  Scale of 1-4, 
with 4 indicating a severe constraint).  Higher values indicate labor regulations are 
more problematic.   
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Indicators (www.doingbusiness.org) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).     
Size  Size is an enterprise variable that measures the number of full-time permanent 
employees at the enterprise.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).   20
Legal Status   Legal Status is a binary variable that measures whether an enterprise is registered as 
a sole proprietorship or as a company.  0 indicates sole proprietorship, while 1 
indicates the enterprise is registered as some form of company.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys  (www.enterprisesurveys.org).    
Binary Bribe Index   Binary Bribe index is a variable that measures whether and enterprise has been 
asked for an informal gift or payment in the past year for one or more of the 
following: Connection/access to public utilities, obtaining business permits, 
obtaining government contracts, to deal with safety, fire, or environmental 
inspections, for tax purposes, for customs, courts, or to influence legislation.  ) 
indicates no bribes were solicited, 1 indicates that at least one bribe was solicited.  
On average, 68% of enterprises report at least one bribe. 
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).   21
Table 2:  Summary Statistics by Country (means) 
      Inform  Br-common Br-taxmtg  Br- govcon Br-safeinsp Br-fireinsp Br-taxinsp Br-convalue  Taxpay  Taxtime  Taxrate  Taxreport_sales Taxreport_labor 
Albania  Mean  0.14  2.60 1.21 2.57 1.92 1.71  3.21 5.69 42  240 55.80  74.69  72.70 
Armenia  Mean  0.06  1.93 1.22 2.16 1.90 1.81 2.98  1.34  50  1120 42.50  94.75  94.76 
Azerbaijan  Mean  0.33  2.44 1.20 1.67 1.47 1.50 2.92  2.18  36  1000 44.90  75.29  75.00 
Belarus  Mean  0.10  2.06 1.65 1.65 1.81 1.93 1.60  0.84 125  1188 186.10  90.25  98.31 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Mean  0.05  1.97  1.36  2.19  2.26 1.79 2.24  0.39  73 100  50.40  88.85  88.30 
Bulgaria  Mean  0.24  2.05 1.44 2.42 2.13 1.93  1.99 4.68 27  616 40.70  83.36  93.12 
Croatia  Mean  0.01  1.67 1.79 1.73 1.47 1.42  1.37 1.05 39  196 37.10  93.60  92.19 
Czech 
Republic  Mean  0.18  1.84 1.56 2.58 1.96 1.87 1.86  2.32  14 930  49.00  87.58  89.66 
Estonia  Mean  0.25  1.49 1.89 1.89 1.48 1.26  1.18 0.48 11  104 50.20  98.00  93.63 
Georgia  Mean  0.02  1.59 1.59 1.77 1.27 1.69  2.06 1.24 35  423 37.80  80.67  80.23 
Hungary  Mean  0.07  1.57 1.77 1.71 1.59 1.53  1.42 1.71 24  304 59.30  89.12  90.99 
Ireland  Mean  0.12  1.27 1.88 1.44 1.26 1.25  1.20 0.42 8 76 25.80  94.89  94.63 
Kazakhstan  Mean  0.10  2.04 1.44 1.90 1.47 1.96  2.19 1.18 34  156 45.00  93.74  96.02 
Kyrgyz 
Republic  Mean  0.08  2.91 1.12 2.52 1.78 2.32 3.85  2.25  89 204  67.40  86.46  88.24 
Latvia  Mean  0.24  1.50 1.73 1.90 1.52 1.71 1.50  1.35  8  320  42.60  92.76  93.69 
Lithuania  Mean  0.20  2.05 1.66 2.73 1.95 2.14  1.62 1.84 13  162 48.40  91.04  93.86 
 Macedonia, 
FYR  Mean  0.25  2.30 1.80 2.17 1.96 1.54 1.33  1.73  54  96  43.50  70.35  72.90 
Moldova  Mean  0.13  2.01 1.57 1.77 1.72 1.69 1.85  0.94  44 250  48.80  88.87  91.57 
Poland  Mean  0.16  1.83 1.61 2.13 1.99 1.72 1.78  1.07  43 175  38.40  88.50  87.03 
Romania  Mean  0.16  2.00 1.74 1.84 1.79 1.52 1.46  0.59  89 198  48.90  92.10  92.12 
Russia  Mean  0.20  2.51 1.36 2.41 1.87 2.67 2.41  2.96  70 256  54.20  84.79  88.24 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  Mean  0.09  2.34 1.43 2.64 2.54 2.06 2.26  1.80  41 168  38.90  88.24  86.68 
Slovakia  Mean  0.18  1.84 1.71 2.45 1.70 1.59 1.51  1.75  30 344  48.90  96.25  94.59 
Slovenia  Mean  0.02  1.48 1.80 1.49 1.34 1.38 1.30  0.67  34 272  39.40  91.09  88.75 
Spain  Mean  0.16  1.45 1.81 1.43 1.20 1.15 1.31  0.38  7  602  59.10  95.25  97.15 
Tajikistan Mean  0.24  2.50  1.18  2.48  2.09 2.64 3.45  2.62  55 224  87.00  88.48  94.70 
Turkey Mean  0.22  1.88 1.63 2.08 1.77 1.72 2.11  7.38  18 254  46.30  69.33  71.13 
Ukraine  Mean  0.13  2.30 1.44 1.75 2.37 2.78 2.24  1.69  98  2185 60.30  86.52  88.33 
Uzbekistan Mean  0.04  2.50  1.17  2.13  1.33 2.96 3.21  1.00 130  152 122.30  97.50  97.12 
Total  Mean  0.14  1.91 1.59 1.98 1.75 1.78 1.90  1.54  42 442  50.06  89.01  90.16   22
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Country-  Continued 

















Albania  Mean  7  47  3.6 44 40 38  30  64.3  30.7  114.0  0.5  0.98 
Armenia  Mean  3  4  0.4 33 40 31  20  13.0  17.5  47.7  0.3  0.80 
Azerbaijan  Mean  7  61  0.3 33 40 38  40  21.7  22.0  81.5  0.3  0.86 
Belarus  Mean 7  231  0.1  0  40  27  40  21.7 39.1 95.7  0.6  0.76 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  Mean  7  331  5.0 56 40 42  30  33.2  15.2  110.2  0.4  0.87 
Bulgaria  Mean  9  19  2.3 50 80 47  10 8.7  30.1  116.2  0.5  0.87 
Croatia  Mean  5  399  5.0 61 40 50  50  39.0  17.2  173.8  0.5  0.51 
Czech 
Republic  Mean  4  123  3.0 33 20 28  30  21.7  35.0  139.1  0.6  0.81 
Estonia  Mean  3  51  0.7 33 80 58  60  34.7  33.5  71.6  1.0  0.68 
Georgia  Mean 6  9  0.5  0  20  7  0  4.3 20.0  136.3  0.8  0.71 
Hungary  Mean  4  78  11.0  11 80 34  10  34.5  35.2  131.7  0.8  0.53 
Ireland  Mean  5  38  10.3  28 40 33  30  49.0  10.8  60.2  0.8  0.35 
Kazakhstan  Mean 8  52  1.8  0  60  23  10  8.7 22.0  131.5  0.6  0.72 
Kyrgyz 
Republic Mean  7  8  1.9  33  40  38 40  17.3  24.5  128.6  0.5  0.90 
Latvia  Mean  8  54  2.0 67 40 59  70  17.3  24.1  91.6  0.6  0.60 
Lithuania  Mean  3  3  0.7 33 80 48  30  30.3  31.2  95.7  0.7  0.79 
Macedonia  Mean  6  98  3.5 61 60 54  40  21.7  32.5  61.5  0.3  0.75 
Moldova  Mean  6  48  1.5 33 60 54  70  28.8  29.0  118.3  0.8  0.74 
Poland  Mean  6  197  2.0  0  60  33  40  13.0 21.4 95.3  0.6  0.67 
Romania  Mean  8  150  1.9 33 80 51  40 3.0  33.3  118.5  1.0  0.70 
Russia  Mean  6  52  0.3 33 60 44  40  17.3  31.0  204.1  0.7  0.88 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  Mean  6  111  5.4 33 40 38  40  27.3  17.9  103.5  0.5  0.82 
Slovakia  Mean  3  17  0.1 17 60 39  40  13.0  35.2  287.0  0.8  0.69 
Slovenia  Mean  6  391  2.0 61 60 57  50  39.6  16.6  180.9  0.7  0.48 
Spain  Mean  3  17  7.2 78 60 63  50  56.3  30.1  144.3  0.8  0.39 
Tajikistan  Mean  6  37  2.0 33 20 31  40  21.7  25.0  117.0  0.6  0.88 
Turkey  Mean  8  9  3.2 56 60 49  30  94.7  21.6  124.9  0.7  0.58 
Ukraine  Mean  10  93  3.4 44 40 55  80  13.0  38.8  148.3  0.8  0.84 
Uzbekistan  Mean  12  97  10.5  33 40 34  30  30.3  31.0  152.8  0.7  0.92 
Total  Mean  6  93  3.6 34 55 42  38  27.3  26.4  120.9  0.7  0.68   23
 
Table 3: Correlations 














convalue Taxpay Taxtime  Taxrate 
Inform  1.00                
Br  -common  -0.02  1.00               
Br  -taxmtg  0.00  0.49*  1.00             
Br - govcon  -0.02  0.45*  0.44*  1.00               
Br -safeinsp  -0.02  0.44*  0.50*  0.57*  1.00             
Br -fireinsp  -0.02  0.48*  0.52*  0.52*  0.72*  1.00           
Br -taxinsp    -0.03*  0.54*  0.82*  0.48*  0.54*  0.57*  1.00         
Br -convalue  0.03*  0.32*  0.28*  0.46* 0.25*  0.29*  0.30*  1.00       
Taxpay   -0.04*  0.26*  0.19*  0.03*  0.15* 0.22* 0.19* 0.00 1.00     
Taxtime 0.00  0.09*  0.14*  -0.01  0.13* 0.17* 0.12* 0.04*  0.37* 1.00   
Taxrate -0.01  0.12*  0.07*  0.00  0.03 0.11*  0.07* 0.01  0.52*  0.30* 1.00 
Taxreport_sales   -0.06*   -0.24*   -0.21*   -0.22*   -0.20*   -0.20*   -0.21*   -0.26*   -0.03*  -0.02  0.00 
Taxreport_labor   -0.04*   -0.22*   -0.19*   -0.23*   -0.21*   -0.19*   -0.20*   -0.24*  -0.01  0.01  0.06* 
Landreg_proc 0.03  0.18*  0.14*  0.01  0.11* 0.19* 0.13* 0.10*  0.55*  0.22* 0.14* 
Landreg_time    -0.08*   -0.03*   -0.08*   -0.03*  0.03*   -0.04*   -0.11*   -0.10*  0.31*   -0.10*  0.07* 
Landreg_cost   -0.06*   -0.21*   -0.20*   -0.13*   -0.12*   -0.15*   -0.19*   -0.08*   -0.34*   -0.15*   -0.11* 
Labregs_hire  0.04*   -0.04*   -0.06*   -0.03*  -0.03   -0.05*   -0.05*  0.02   -0.16*  0.15*   -0.09* 
Labregs_hours  0.05*   -0.03*   -0.14*  -0.01  -0.02   -0.08*   -0.17*  0.01   -0.04*   -0.33*   -0.05* 
Labregs_rigid  0.07*  -0.02   -0.13*   -0.05*  0.00   -0.04*   -0.14*   -0.03*  0.00  0.13*  -0.02 
Labregs_fire  0.04*  0.03   -0.06*   -0.05*  0.05*  0.06*   -0.06*   -0.09*  0.24*  0.35*  0.10* 
Labregs_firecost  0.01   -0.14*   -0.14*   -0.07*   -0.11*   -0.15*   -0.09*  0.03*   -0.48*   -0.20*   -0.04* 
Labregs_hirecost 0.06*  0.13*  0.01 0.04*  0.09* 0.13* -0.02 0.08*  0.35*  0.41* 0.51* 
Size   -0.07*  -0.03   -0.05*   -0.04*   -0.4* -0.02    -0.04*  -0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 
Legal Status    -0.07*   -0.03*   -0.14*   -0.03*   -0.06*   -0.04*   -0.13*  -0.02  -0.01   -0.04*  0.03 
Binary Bribe 
Index  0.04* 0.50*  0.62*  0.51*  0.49*  0.49* 0.51* 0.25*  0.21*  0.11* 0.09* 
   24
 



























Taxreport_sales  1.00                   
Taxreport_labor  0.70*  1.00                  
Landreg_proc    -0.13*    -0.10*  1.00                 
Landreg_time    0.04*  -0.01  0.13*  1.00                
Landreg_cost  0.07*  0.05*    -0.21*  -0.01  1.00             
Labregs_hire   -0.04*   -0.03*  0.00  0.01  0.10*  1.00               
Labregs_hours 0.01  0.03*  -0.02    -0.09*  -0.01    -0.10*  1.00         
Labregs_rigid -0.01  0.00  0.08*  0.04*    -0.03*  0.79*  0.33*  1.00        
Labregs_fire 0.03*  0.00  0.18*  0.17*    -0.19* 0.44*   -0.16* 0.71* 1.00         
Labregs_firecost   -0.11*   -0.13*   -0.24*    -0.12* 0.48*  0.45*   -0.07* 0.25* 0.01  1.00       
Labregs_hirecost   -0.04*  0.01  0.11*   -0.16*   -0.19*  0.02  0.37*  0.32*  0.24*   -0.25*  1.00     
Size  0.06*  0.06* 0.01  0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.05*  1.00   
Legal Status   0.14*  0.15*  -0.02   -0.07*  0.10* -0.01 0.17* 0.11*  0.07* 0.05* 0.15*  0.14*  1.00 
Binary Bribe Index   -0.20*   -0.18*  0.14*  -0.01   -0.23*   -0.06*   -0.04*   -0.06*  0.00   -0.18*  0.12*   -0.07*   -0.08* 
  * indicates significant t-test at the 10% level 












Age Years *  16.5  14.7 
% Foreign Owned  8.8%  10.6% 
Size (# employees) *  132.7  49.6 
Growth (% in employees)  6.1  2.4 
Labor productivity (sales/#employees) 121.5  39.5 
Assets (estimated replacement value of land 
equipment and buildings in USD) *   3774 1378 
Exports * (% of sales exported directly or 
indirectly through a distributor)  12.9  8.2 
% With Audited Financial Statements *  55.9%  44.2% 
% Working Capital financed by Retained 
Earnings 41.7%  43.5% 
* indicates significant t-test at the 10% level    
A Chi Squares test performed on the distribution of 
enterprises by legal status shows significant 
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Table 5:  Corruption Regression 

















































































































































































































































Regressions  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #9  #10  #11  #12  #13  #14  #13  #14 
-0.002 -0.031 -0.002 -0.034 -0.002 -0.031 -0.002  -0.03 -0.002 -0.03 -0.002  -0.035  -0.002 -0.03 
Size  [3.56]**  [4.25]** [2.23]* [4.88]**  [3.58]** [4.17]** [3.56]** [4.23]** [3.58]** [4.24]** [2.25]* [5.15]**  [3.58]**  [4.24]** 
-0.351  -0.301 -0.54 -0.608  -0.361  -0.314  -0.356 -0.31  -0.355 -0.313 -0.535 -0.598 -0.353 -0.306 
Legal Status  [2.79]** [2.20]* [3.36]**  [2.80]**  [2.90]** [2.37]* [2.85]** [2.29]* [2.88]** [2.33]* [3.35]**  [2.78]**  [2.87]** [2.28]* 
0.277  0.368                                     
Br-common   [1.42]  [1.72]+                                     
      -1.633  -1.582                               
Br-taxmtg        [1.98]*  [1.81]+                               
            0.153  0.149                         
Br-convalue              [2.55]*  [2.37]*                         
                  0.213  0.223                   
Br-safeinsp                    [0.74]  [0.79]                   
                        0.454  0.457             
Br-fireinsp                          [1.86]+  [1.90]+             
                              0.604  0.695       
Br-taxinsp                                [1.96]*  [2.13]*       
                                    0.925  0.911  Binary Bribe 
Index                                      [1.96]*  [1.65]+ 
Country  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  3564 2246 2119 1287 3567 2249 3564 2248 3564 2248 2119 1287 3569 2251 
Robust  z  statistics  in  brackets              
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Table 6: Tax Regressions 













































































































































































Regressions  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9  #10 
-0.002 -0.031 -0.002 -0.031 -0.002 -0.031 -0.002 -0.031 -0.002 -0.031 
Size  [3.54]** [4.29]** [3.54]** [4.30]** [3.54]** [4.27]** [3.53]** [4.38]** [3.54]** [4.28]** 
-0.362 -0.318 -0.354 -0.306 -0.353 -0.301 -0.326  -0.29  -0.325 -0.285 
Legal Status  [2.87]** [2.31]* [2.81]** [2.22]* [2.77]** [2.14]* [2.74]** [2.12]*  [2.56]*  [2.06]* 
0.009  0.011                         
Taxpay  [1.74]+  [1.90]+                         
      0.011  0.024                   
Taxtime        [2.57]*  [4.81]**                   
            0  0.002             
Taxrate              [0.10]  [0.46]             
                  -0.009  -0.004       
Tax Report Sales                    [1.11]  [0.31]       
                        -0.023  -0.022 
Tax Report Labor                          [2.11]*  [1.75]+ 
Country  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  3564 2246 3564 2246 3564 2246 3511 2201 3527 2222
Robust z statistics in brackets                   
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             
  






Table 7: Land Regressions 









































































































Regressions  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
-0.002 -0.03 -0.002  -0.031  -0.002 -0.03 
Size  [3.54]** [4.28]** [3.56]** [4.29]** [3.53]** [4.27]** 
-0.369 -0.326 -0.361 -0.314 -0.362 -0.318 
Legal Status  [2.97]** [2.43]* [2.88]** [2.31]* [2.88]** [2.30]* 
0.061  0.068             
Landreg_proc  [2.08]*  [1.95]+             
      0.097  0.13       
Landreg_cost        [2.03]*  [2.72]**       
            0.004  0.004 
Landreg_time              [3.38]**  [3.09]** 
Country  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  3568 2250 3568 2250 3568 2250
Robust z statistics in brackets           
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       29
 
Table 8: Corruption Regressions by Reported Sales Level 

























































































































































































































































Regressions  #1 #2  #3  #4 #5 #6  #9 #10 #9 #10 #9 #10 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
Size  [2.02]* [1.26] [3.14]**  [2.36]*  [2.05]* [1.28] [3.09]** [2.42]* [3.10]** [2.40]* [3.12]** [2.36]* 
-0.49 -0.844 -0.253 -0.503  -0.481 -0.86 -0.253 -0.486 -0.251 -0.492 -0.244 -0.473 
Legal Status  [2.35]* [2.25]* [1.65]+  [1.52]  [2.33]* [2.27]*  [1.62] [1.57] [1.62] [1.56] [1.60] [1.54] 
-1.988  -0.87                               
Br-taxmtg  [1.79]+  [0.73]                               
      0.191  0.066                         
Br-convalue        [1.80]+  [0.99]                         
            0.799  0.325                   
Br-taxinsp              [1.91]+  [0.70]                   
                  -0.035  0.007             
Taxreport_sales                    [1.74]+  [0.15]             
                        -0.056  0.009       
Taxreport_labor                          [2.10]*  [0.24]       
                              0.93  0.946  Binary Bribe 
Index                                [1.46]  [0.84] 
Country  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1454 301 2442 517 1454 301 2442 519 2442 519 2442 519 
Robust  z  statistics  in  brackets            
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%               
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Table 9: Regulation Regressions by Reported Sales Level 

























































































































































































































































Regressions  #15 #16 #17 #18 #17 #18 #17 #18 #17 #18 #17 #18 
-0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
Size  [3.09]** [2.29]* [3.11]** [2.37]* [3.10]** [2.38]* [3.11]** [2.23]* [3.12]** [2.40]* [3.11]** [2.29]* 
-0.247 -0.509 -0.248 -0.505 -0.256 -0.496 -0.249 -0.498 -0.249 -0.546 -0.245 -0.511 
Legal Status  [1.56] [1.67]+ [1.59]  [1.64] [1.65]+ [1.59]  [1.59] [1.59] [1.60]  [1.71]+  [1.57] [1.63] 
Busregcost  0.006  0.107                               
   [0.23]  [2.56]*                               
Landreg_cost        0.073  0.304                         
         [1.66]+  [3.38]**                         
Landreg_time              0.007  0.006                   
               [4.42]**  [1.91]+                   
                  -0.002  0.04             
Labregs_firecost                    [0.29]  [4.45]**             
                        0.007  0.03       
Taxpay                          [1.07]  [2.78]**       
                              0.012  0.022 
Taxtime                                [1.91]+  [2.64]** 
Country  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry  FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  2442 519 2442 519 2442 519 2442 519 2442 519 2442 519 
Robust z statistics in brackets             
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%          
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Figure 1   
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